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Abstract
Due to emergence of wireless networks and immense use of hand held devices, wireless networks encounter a great
threat of denial of service attack. Traditionally IP-Based Filtering has been used to combat these attacks, however
studies shows that thousands of distributed zombies work in cooperation generate huge network traﬃc that result in
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks and illegitimate access to resources and services. In this paper, ﬁrst we
studied attacks and mitigation scenarios to analyze network wide DDoS security anomalies. This will help us to drive
supplementary active measurements to characterize the strength and characteristic of attacks to improve correlation of
our log data and with other publicly available network traﬃc analysis data. Secondly, we presented a monitoring scheme
to simulate a variety of attacks on diﬀerent mobile operating system. This will identify the potential threat of diﬀerent
DDoS attacks for such platform and traﬃc scanning activity to avoid detection of attacks such as Ping to Death DDoS
attack. Third, we followed proceedings of an enduring basis to extort trends in the attack frequency, make-up, and
production of extensive DDoS attacks. This longitudinal analysis was necessary for understanding the progression of
the threats and vulnerabilities. In conclusion, while analyzing our early results concerning large-scale DDoS attack.
We used a hybrid approach to diminish and prevent the attack. Network Simulator 2 (NS-2) is used to imitate the real
environment and to create attack traﬃc with diﬀerent attack strength. The simulation results are encouraging as we were
able to establish, and approximate strength of DDoS attack eﬃciently
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are comparatively straightforward yet powerful method to
consume network resources. Large numbers of such attacks are proliferated in the network to stop/block
the legitimate stream of network traﬃc and shutdown the the system recourses. For instance Visa and
MasterCard’s sites were hacked (DDoS) on 8th December, 2010 by a network of 15,000 online activists,
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the attackers launched the ”Operation Payback” attack. This was carried out in revenge of the credit card
groups and PayPal’s statement that they would no longer process donations to WikiLeaks [1]. In the weeks
leading up to the ﬁve-day 2008 South Ossetia war, a DDoS attack directed at Georgian government sites
containing the message: ”win+love+in+Rusia” eﬀectively overloaded and shut down multiple Georgian
servers. Websites targeted included the Web site of the Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, rendered
inoperable for 24 hours, and the National Bank of Georgia. While heavy suspicion was placed on Russia
for orchestrating the attack through a proxy, the St. Petersburg-based criminal gang known as the Russian
Business Network (R.B.N), the Russian government denied the allegations, stating that it was possible that
individuals in Russia or elsewhere had taken it upon themselves to start the attacks 2. The ﬁrst major attack
involving DNS servers as reﬂectors occurred in January 2001 targeted towards Register.com. This attack,
which forged requests for the MX records of AOL.com (to amplify the attack) lasted about a week before it
could be traced back to all attacking hosts and shut oﬀ. It used a list of tens of thousands of DNS records
that were a year old at the time of the attack.
Internet Protocol(IP) spooﬁng attacks and rapid growth in legitimate & illegitimate packets are most critical
attacks that obstruct security solutions to defend network against DDoS attacks. These attacks are normally
launched from remote networks by utilizing software like Trojan Horse that help to ﬂood packets towards
victimize web servers. During this situation defense solutions becomes unproductive and could not detect
attacks with high accuracy, hence it become hard to distinguish between ﬂash crowd and attack packets. In
computer science Flash crowd [2] is a condition when a very outsized number of normal clients concurrently
try connect to a web server, and thus this huge volume of traﬃc hinder users to connect to any website.
As the assailant imitates normal requests, attack methodologies are identical from normal sessions. As
an example, if the zombie machine employ applicable IP addresses from botnets, both network and host
server assaults will cheat the ingress ﬁltering security which is an eﬀective solution against address spooﬁng
attacks. Moreover network detectors will not be able to detect server attack signatures which make it diﬃcult
to deign suspicion handling technique. In this paper, we presented a defense mechanism to defend against
DDoS attack and provide suﬃcient service to justiﬁable consumers even throughout an attack. The solution
is based of a DDoS Guard which is incorporated into the backend proxy and accordingly program to accept
or reject stream packets before they reach the HTTP cluster level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we discuss related work. In section , we
present the traﬃc monitoring and defense model. In section4, we describe our experimental testbed and
discussed the impact on genuine client sessions due to the DDoS attack. Finally, we conclude our work in
section 5.
2. Related Work
To protect against DDoS attacks, we can categories defense mechanisms into proactive solution and
reactive solution. Proactive solutions observe the behavior of traﬃc stream and mitigate defense before it
occurs. Such solutions are mainly based on secure overlay networks (SON) [3], and [4]. SON will behave as
honeypot proxy for the possible victim server. All incoming communication must pass through proxy node
which can identify normal and attack traﬃc based on packet marking. Whereas reactive solution needs;
correct identiﬁcation of malicious node, and attack traﬃc path to take necessary attack prevention actions
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Proactive defense is expensive than reactive scanning and used only for critical services.
Savage et al. enhanced the basic packet marking algorithm to ﬁnd out the actual source of attack origina-
tor. Park’s study [10] conﬁrms that simple packet marking scheme [6] may not be an eﬃcient solution to
traceback the DDoS attack source. Afterward, by avoiding false positives in scattered fragmented marked
packets, Perrig [5] recreate the attack graph by improving information collection rate (ICR) and lessen the
time overhead of restoration process during DDoS attack. ICR algorithm is helpful to highlight the attack
signature which facilitates to militate against attack.
The TCP layer is an additional main scuﬄe area for determining DDoS attack. Cabrera et al. [11] mapped
2http://www.honeynet.org/about
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Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and Transmission Control Pro-
tocol (TCP) packet arithmetical anomaly to precise DDoS attacks based on management information base
(MIB). Wang et al. [12] adopted the TCP SYN packets for identifying SYN ﬂooding attacks. Lim et al.
[13], DDoS attacks were exposed by examining the TCP packet header alongside the preset rules & settings
and famed the dissimilarity between normal and malicious packet stream. Noh et al. [14] endeavored to
distinguish abnormality by calculating the fraction of TCP ﬂags with TCP stream reached at HTTP server.
In our recent work [15] we suggest that better results can be achieved by using the appropriate marking
scheme which is dynamically change able according to network topology. Using the handshake protocol,
scheme can make decision of appropriate marking scheme and can further achieve the trace out of attack
packets. Paper study profoundly, the relationship between the marking scheme and performance and found
that the drop rate against attack packets is smaller as long as the acceptance ratio gap is smaller. PMS scheme
is quite promising in performance. Functionally, PMS is a critical prevention to today’s most common in-
ternet attacks. To extend our work we suggest that [16] instead of designing centralize defense systems, it
is important to design distributed detection and defense system where heterogeneous nodes can collaborate
over the network and monitor traﬃc in cooperative manner. Scheme presents a distributed collaborative de-
tection and defense mechanism, where heterogeneous defense nodes can be placed in the network to monitor
traﬃc in cooperative manner with other nodes in network. The cooperation between each detecting node
is done with reliable communication mechanism. Directional information exchange mechanism is used to
improve accuracy of each individual node.
Most of solutions presented in literature need broad alteration of routers that make it enormously com-
plicated to be deployed to on hand routing infrastructure. All routers should be reprogrammed to work
correctly. In packet ﬂood scenario where a outsized number of zombies are collectively launching attack,
fresh information from strategically deployed multiple network devices should be collected to draw a well-
informed decision.
3. DDoS Traﬃc Monitoring and Defense Model
To launch comprehensive and eﬀective attack, we analyzed attack traﬃc patterns sniﬀed from multiple
sources and highlighted network & traﬃc behavior which make it diﬀerent from legitimate traﬃc. We
observed that 79% ”Ping to Death and SYN attacks” sustain its intensity less than 52 mins and very few
were able to continue attack for couple of hours [17]. We found malicious traﬃc (packet & byte count) and
assault duration is correlated for all analyzed datasets. After analyzing of packet ﬂow stream, we strongly
believe that watchdog can use sudden and consistent traﬃc increase as a signature of attack alarm. Our
experimental and background study portrayed that (a) Eighty ﬁve percent of previously launched attack
signatures represent that each participant packet was smaller than 100 byte, (b) attacks were not largely
distributed and (c) few packets were locally spoofed.
To enforce security policy, we have implemented node centrality algorithm which deﬁnes the autonomy
capacity to access HTTP node. It can be calculated as mean of traﬃc ﬂow and routed path between nodes
(zombie & victim server). Based on cumulative distribution of packet density, a ranking of participant nodes
can be donated P1 < P2 < ...Pn−1 < Pn and calcuated using equation 1.
f (p1) =
1∑n
j=1 Pj
1∑
k=1
Pk (1)
Where fI = i/n and I = 1, ..., n in the packet stream. Further we calculated Gini coeﬃcient to calculate the
stream behavior using equation2 and 3.
g = 1 − 2
∫ 1
0
Φ(P)dp (2)
g = 1 − Φ(P0) + Φ(Pn)
n
− 2
n
n−1∑
k−1
Φ(Pk) = 1 − 1n
n∑
k−1
[Φ(Pk−1] (3)
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Here Φ(P0) = 0 and Φ(Pn) = 1 for ﬂow analyzation. It will demand the proportion of packet ﬂood between
legitimate and illegitimate stream. For better network traﬃc analyzation we sniﬀed the activity data from
university network. We utilized collected data for training and testing dataset. For the decision technique
application we trained both normal and intrusive activities to capture the signature patterns of both models.
For performance analysis of observed packet stream we calculated mean, maximum and minimum of ”in-
trusion warning” values. Each signature is helpful for each decision model.
Once we have categorized the traﬃc signatures, we need to identify zombie node and block its activity. In
our application, if we suppose that the node gain knowledge of victim’s traﬃc ﬂow pattern, then for every
transaction, a zombie node can learn a bit of information about the traﬃc pattern. In support of example,
the node can attempt to estimate one of the router’s ﬂows, cipher it and witness if the victim accepts. In this
scenario, in order to protect a superior complexity, we should suppose that malfunction do not occur very
frequently. Few important issues should be in consideration while testing like
1. The core entree is requisite to load a application. A client node, a server node (defense station)
requires launching client Filter.
2. The defense station utilizes TCP stream from diverse foundation ports as they are arriving from dis-
similar host nodes, although they have similar source IP (egress ﬁltering will encounter spooﬁng
attacks).
3. Proposed scenario desire to evaluate the speed of defense system converge, how waiting intermission
transform, how many packets from valid node are dropped, how many packets from malicious nodes
are dropped.
4. Experiment and Discussion
To evaluate the performance of proposed solution, we adopt a factual internet connected victim server
with DDoS attack discovery settings. We installed a victim machine situated in the Imam Mohammad ibn
Saud University running apache tomcat service on Linux operating system. The HTTP server is equipped
with Intel CPU 2.7GHz, 1GB RAM, and 40GB hard disk. On the other hand, we install an observer host
node to experience the quality of service of HTTP server and gather the standard dataset for our proposed
scheme, and determined the usual detection scenarios. For behavior analysis, we perform many tests over
ﬁve days for the period of eventful hours and generated huge amount of false data traﬃc from more than
3,000 hosts of the university. During experiment, we have gathered three sets of trace data. The majority
of traces are gathered from single setting. We also gather supplementary traces on dissimilar hosts from
diverse locations to hold up our conclusion. To measure the strength of distributed denial of service attacks
in accordance to our proposed scheme, we considered the following parameters:
• CPU consumption on the HTTP and data storage tier.
• Measurement of abnormal reply time of ACK as an sign of the slow down a trusted node usage.
• Standard throughput in requests/sec. accomplished based on per node connection.
Further proposed scheme analyzed the behavior of unique IP addresses and minimum bandwidth require-
ment to launch a successful attack.
5. Conclusion
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) is a foremost hazard to the Internet these days. Valid users have
a hard time connecting to the servers that are open to DDoS attacks. These attacks impersonate normal
clients and consume the system resources at extensive scale, in this manner considerably refusing service
to the normal nodes. This paper proposed a DDoS defense solution which consigns distrust evaluation to
a timestamp in fraction to its divergence from normal behavior and uses a DDoS resistance approach to
choose whether and at what time the timestamp is utilized. Using an experimental testbed, we veriﬁed the
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strength of DDoS attack as well as the eﬀectiveness of DDoS defense capability to prevent it. We made
two conclusion from this study. (a) For edge analysis, providing the extensive bandwidth is more useful
when the packet rate of an assault go beyond a deﬁned threshold. We deﬁned threshold (1200 packet per
second for attack upstream and 1500 packet per second for edge node) is lesser while the ﬁlter position is
nearer to the attack nodes. (b) In support of source analysis, the horizontal rate method is useful in terms of
beneﬁt-cost.
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